Since the modernization, some years ago, of municipal rule-making powers by Quebec's Municipal Powers Act , municipalities have turned increasingly to defining and regulating nuisances. This is rarely an easy task, as illustrated by the February 17, 2011, judgment in Iredale v. Ville de Mont-Tremblant.
Litigation over noise from the Mont-Tremblant motorsports track (Circuit Mont-Tremblant) has been going on for quite some time, with some residents in the trendy and upscale ski centre village and surrounding area (similar to Whistler in B.C.) taking issue with the noise level from the nearby circuit. In this particular case, the residents' group applied to Quebec Superior Court to quash a settlement agreement reached in 2006 between the circuit's owner and the town, as well as town by-laws made in consequence of the settlement agreement whereby the circuit was partially exempted from the town's noise by-laws.
The circuit has been in operation since 1964, with roughly a one-year period, in 2000-2001, during which it did not operate because of major renovations. Residential development in the area began to take off in the early to mid-1990s, and the number of residences within 500 m of the track's perimeter gradually increased. By about 2002, noise from the circuit had become an issue in the community and noise regulation by the town, as well as litigation, began at about that time. In 2006, the town reached a settlement with the circuit by which the town basically agreed to implement or modify by-laws to allow use of the track without any noise limitations for a limited number of days during the season (April-September).
The residents argued various points, but their essential position was that the by-laws were unreasonable and permitted the unregulated continuance of a nuisance.
As a touchstone for assessment, the Court found that describing the situation as one consisting of intermittent noise was most adequate (following Le Petit Train du Nord). The most appropriate approach in the Court's view one which appreciated the existence or not of a nuisance in the context of the difference between ambient noise and "noise emergence" (increase in ambient noise levels). However, the question was not whether that method was better than the one chosen by the Town, but rather whether the Town's choice was reasonable in the same context.
The Court decided that the track's prior existence and operation was not of special relevance, but was but one aspect of the overall context to be considered, noting that recent cases such as St. Lawrence Cement and Auberge du Parc stand for the proposition that the context has to be considered in each case having regard to Article 976 of the Civil Code of Quebec, which obliges neighbours to accept the normal inconveniences of neighbourhood (and so by corollary not abnormal inconveniences). In regulating, the Town had to take this into account.
Noting that the Town of Mont-Tremblant is no longer the placid area which it once was, the Court held that the Town by-laws at issue were nevertheless inoperative insofar as they allowed unrestricted operation of the circuit. While there was consensus (presumably within the community) that the circuit had to remain and that its antecedence had to be taken into account, the Court held that it was nevertheless impossible to reconcile the absence of any noise restriction with the objectives reflected by article 20 of Quebec's Environment Quality Act (general prohibition against release, etc., of a contaminant, which includes noise). The Court concluded that the only objective manner of mitigating the situation was to limit use of the Circuit to cars equipped with mufflers.
This is far from over. The Town has appealed.
Antecedence remains a thorny issue and which is likely to be debated in appeal. Despite apparently clear judicial statements to the effect that while antecedence is neither a sword nor a shield, but merely a factor to be considered, it is far from clear precisely how the Courts are taking antecedence into account. The question can indeed be asked if the concept is not defunct. We seem to have arrived at a point at which antecedence is worth nothing more than acceptance in principle that the undertaking source of the nuisance can continue as such, but under conditions ensuring that the nuisance will be eliminated. That doesn't say much for antecedence as a factor at all. Possibly this only serves to illustrate that we haven't yet seen the end of antecedence as an issue in these cases.